Tokenized supplyMultiplier-adjusted, as the feed prices it3,956.21
Supply value at the oracle mark$2M
Collateral depositedRequires a deployed POTUSComet—Not available: Not deployedNot deployed
USDG debtRequires a deployed market—Not available: Not deployedNot deployed
Available capacity—Not available: Not deployedNot deployed
Supply capSet by governance at listing—Not available: Not deployedNot deployed
Oracle
Status—Not available: Checking feedChecking feed
Last published—Not available: Checking feedChecking feed
HeartbeatMaximum interval between publishes86,400s — 24h
Deviation thresholdRepublishes early if price moves this far0.5%
Feed decimals8
Protocol staleness toleranceoracleMaxAge in Deploy.s.sol93,600s — 26h
Risk parameters
Collateral factorMost that can be borrowed against it96%
Liquidation threshold98%
Margin to bad debtFrom the liquidation threshold to 100% LTV2.0%
Margin after oracle errorThe permitted 0.5% deviation comes straight out of it1.5%
Targets under review, not live settings. The published risk model does not support the 97% tier — a position at a 98% liquidation threshold is really at 98.49% once the oracle’s permitted deviation is counted, and cannot pay a market-rate liquidation bonus out of its own collateral.
Exit liquidity
Exit healthLiquidation bonus, less what selling actually costsAdequate+1.86%
Swap venueWhere a liquidator would sell this collateralUniswap v3
In-range liquidityZero means the pool exists but is not a market217586262314117885
A liquidator clears this, with margin left after the exit but not much of it.
A venue is not a market. Concentrated liquidity makes normal-conditions liquidation tractable with modest capital, and stops being a bid the moment price leaves its band — which is when a liquidation needs one.
Corporate-action multiplier1.0 means none in effect1.000000
Transfers paused—Not available: CheckingChecking
The issuer can burn or freeze this token. Every Stock Token is a beacon proxy, and all of them share one beacon, so a single upgrade changes them all. The shared implementation exposes adminBurn(address,uint256), which burns from any holder — including a lending protocol — and pause(), which would stop liquidation by making collateral unseizable. These are ordinary powers for a regulated issuer of a tokenized security, and they are a risk POTUSFI cannot engineer away.
