All docs
Security model
Invariants, upgradeability and the principles that constrain the design.
Spec: README Sections 55-59, 78
Protocol invariants
These are the properties that must hold for the system to be solvent. They are intended to be enforced in code and fuzz-tested, not merely asserted in prose.
- Debt ≤ borrowing capacity
- Total debt ≤ the governance borrow cap
- Collateral ≤ asset supply cap
- An invalid oracle cannot authorize new borrowing
- The pool can only owe more than it holds by what it has recognised as bad debt
- Liquidation cannot create unaccounted debt
- Treasury cannot withdraw user collateral
Privileged control
No single EOA should control the market's policy, treasury, the oracle, collateral configuration, upgrades or governance. Critical contracts sit behind a multisig plus timelock plus governor, with a pause-only guardian for emergencies.
Upgradeability
| Component | Posture |
|---|---|
| USDG | External — Robinhood Chain's stablecoin, not a POTUSFI contract |
| POTUS Comet | Upgradeable through governance only |
| Risk configuration | Governance controlled |
| Emergency pause | Guardian controlled |
Principles
- No unlimited admin mint
- No single-wallet treasury control
- No arbitrary collateral listing
- No borrowing against stale prices
- No instant governance execution for critical changes
- No dependence on a single liquidity venue
- No recursive leverage presented as organic TVL
- No pretending the pool cannot run dry — liquidity refusals are a stated, monitored state